Foreword
The case for transition investment — allocating capital to generate measurable impact along with market or above-market returns — has been made. Across previous editions of this report, a consistent narrative has emerged: that investing in the sustainable development of emerging markets and developing economies — particularly across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia — is not a philanthropic gesture but a compelling investment proposition. The asset class argument is no longer contested among the most sophisticated institutional investors; it is increasingly taken as a point of departure.
Yet capital flows tell a different story. Despite growing acknowledgment of transition investment as a legitimate and potentially attractive asset class, the reallocation of institutional capital from developed markets to the Global South remains stubbornly below what the scale of the opportunity — and the urgency of the challenge — demands. Of the roughly US$486 trillion in global financial assets, only about 10% is invested in the Global South, against 35% in the United States alone, and even impact-labelled private funds direct just 12% of their capital there. Redirecting about 6% of global assets would be enough to close the estimated US$30 trillion financing gap in emerging markets and least developed countries. The gap between conviction and commitment is wide, and it is not narrowing fast enough.
The reasons are structural. Persistent perceptions of concessionary returns continue to shadow emerging market and least developed country investments, even as accumulating evidence suggests these perceptions are increasingly disconnected from reality. Data deficits compound the problem: without reliable, comparable, and granular information on risk, return, and impact, institutional investors cannot build the investment cases their governance frameworks require. And even where conviction exists and data is available, the market infrastructure needed to deploy capital at scale — liquid secondary markets, credible exit pathways, and appropriate capital treatment — remains underdeveloped or fragmented.
In short, the asset class exists. The market does not — not yet, not fully. Building it is the work of this moment.
The contributions in this report shed light on where and how this market can be built, and they share a pattern. Each opportunity rests on a friction, whether an unreliable buyer, missing information about supply, a shortage of authorised carbon or a thin capital market, that keeps conventional capital away and leaves price below value. Each gap is also temporary, closing as buyers become creditworthy, verification becomes standard, authorisations scale and exits create comparables. The investor’s edge lies in the capability to see the value early and in vehicles patient enough to wait for the market to recognise it. This is what building the market means in practice: the gaps close only as investors step in, and those who move first set the terms for those who follow.
The fourth edition of the Transition Investment Workshop (TIW), at which this publication is officially launched, marks another milestone for us. It reflects the growing visibility of the Transition Investment Lab (TIL) within the Abu Dhabi ecosystem, driven by new initiatives and strategic partnerships over the past year.
This year’s TIW will also the launch of an important milestone: ImpactX, an evidence-based, AI-powered platform for ex ante impact measurement. Built on TIL’s proprietary Signature Impact Framework, ImpactX rates the expected impact of a deal before capital moves, scoring it against peer-reviewed studies and country-level data, with every score validated by TIL researchers before publication. We are proud that it addresses one of the barriers this report identifies, giving allocators the evidence they need in the markets where data is scarcest.
Another important TIL’s announcement is that Investindustrial, a pioneer of sustainability in private equity, joined TIL as lead partner, and we are delighted to welcome them on board.
Looking ahead, we will continue to deepen our research and analysis, and we invite you to follow our work as it evolves. We extend our sincere appreciation to our partners, old and new: our founding partners, Mubadala Investment Company and MEASA Partners, for their continued support, and our new lead partner, Investindustrial, for joining us on this journey. We also thank the TIL Steering Committee for its guidance. Finally, our warmest thanks go to our fellows and students, whose curiosity and commitment drive our research and extend its reach well beyond the Lab.
The contributions to this year’s report take up the work of building the market for transition investment. Each examines a place where the market has yet to form, whether for lack of a creditworthy buyer, of reliable information, of authorised supply or of growth capital, and asks what it would take for commercial capital to step in. Together they challenge the perception of concessionary returns directly: where investors help resolve a genuine market failure that other capital has not yet addressed, they can be both additional and commercially rewarded.
In the opening article, Bernardo Bortolotti and James Gifford set out the framework for that claim. The view that capital makes a difference only when investors accept lower returns, they argue, holds only where markets function well. An investment is additional when the company changes the world relative to a realistic counterfactual and the investor’s money is hard to replace. Too shallow a market failure leaves little to change; too deep a failure leaves little chance of commercial success, and is better suited to development finance, governments and philanthropy. In between lies a narrow band, the Goldilocks zone, where capital is both additional and earns risk-adjusted market returns. This is the target of transition investors. The zone exists because capital markets are inefficient, so the investor’s edge comes from capability rather than intention, and it is widest in the frontier markets that institutional investors visit least. Harvesting it calls for vehicles more patient than the ten-year closed-end fund, an area where sovereign wealth funds, family offices and other long-horizon owners hold an advantage, and for engaging with these markets before their data becomes ubiquitous.
Nana Maidugu argues that Africa’s investment problem is less a shortage of capital than a mismatch between the capital on offer and what projects need. Infrastructure needs long-tenor, local-currency, appropriately priced finance. What is available tends to be short-term and expensive, and it is often priced on blanket country risk assumptions that miss the economics of individual projects. Much of the “financing gap” is also a project-preparation gap. Projects with unresolved land rights, weak revenue models or incomplete feasibility work cannot be financed however much capital is available.
He sees the main role of sovereign wealth funds as building markets rather than funding deals one by one. That means using their capital to set up platforms, absorb clearly defined risks, and crowd in larger pools of private and domestic money. Concessional finance should go only to genuine market failures and should not cover ordinary commercial risk. He judges blended finance by whether it was truly additional and whether it can be repeated, not by the headline amount of capital mobilised. NSIA examples run through the piece: InfraCredit linking pension savings to infrastructure debt, the InfraGrow blended-finance platform, and RIPLE and the Nigeria DRE Fund as aggregation vehicles. He treats sustainability as part of financial discipline because it drives both risk and opportunity, not as a compliance exercise.
He closes with five priorities: deploy capital strategically, build bankable pipelines through self-replenishing preparation facilities, allocate risk efficiently, mobilise domestic institutional savings, and build sustainability into how value is created. Patient capital buys time. “Permanent capital” means institutions and markets that keep mobilising and recycling investment, with SWFs acting as architects of investment ecosystems rather than just sources of funds.
Bernardo Bortolotti and Martin Nagell then turn to a case where the economics already favour clean energy and the capital still fails to arrive. Business tariffs in 47 of Africa’s 54 countries exceed the cost of new solar or wind, and the oil- and diesel-fired plants that keep the lights on cost two to three times as much as solar with storage, yet the continent draws about 2% of global clean-energy investment. The obstacle is the buyer. A solar plant is paid for almost entirely up front, so its price is set by the cost of finance: in their model, moving from a 6% to a 14% cost of capital raises the price a solar-and-storage plant needs by about 65%. That cost, in turn, is set by the credit of state-owned utilities whose social obligations, pursued for good reasons, leave them short of cash when public transfers arrive late. The usual remedies, from letters of credit to sovereign guarantees, all lean on the same government. They propose instead a ring-fenced subsidiary, owned by the utility, that buys renewable power through open tenders and sells it to business customers, whose payments reach producers first through an independent trustee. Each element has worked somewhere, from Zambia and India to Britain, and the structure could earn a credit standing above the sovereign’s while control and dividends stay with the state. In five leading markets, Senegal, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa and Kenya, it could bring about 8.6 GW of solar with storage and US$8bn of private investment to financial close within ten years. In Senegal alone, replacing oil-fired supply to business customers could save the power sector in the order of €260m a year, several times the cost of this year’s cut to the social tariff.
Tarikua Erda turns to a different kind of market failure: the credit that dries up after a disaster. Drawing on four decades of US factory data, she compares floods that received federal disaster assistance with similarly severe floods that did not. Where aid flowed, floods mostly finished off plants that were already struggling, survivors upgraded their machinery, young firms bought the equipment sold off and grew, and new entrants were about 14% more productive than earlier ones. Without aid, banks lent mainly to firms they already knew, small and new businesses were squeezed out, and productivity and incomes fell. Public recovery money, she finds, helps a flooded economy renew itself rather than simply repair, and the extra tax revenue from stronger recoveries can repay the upfront cost, a lesson of growing relevance as climate change raises flood risk in regions with little history of it.
As usual, the report features contributions from our target region of choice: the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. Rana Hajirasouli argues that resource security, the confidence that the materials, assets and capabilities a business depends on will be available when conditions change, is an investment theme in its own right in the Gulf. As national champions such as Aramco and ADNOC qualify local suppliers, private capital can extend the work to the wider supplier base by financing independent verification of physical assets, coordinating resources across holding-group portfolios and funding the qualification of alternative suppliers. Wahid Kamalian shows how compliance carbon demand under CORSIA and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, together with disrupted supply of a forest ingredient that food and medical-device makers cannot replace, create a special situation in East Africa’s forests. The tenure and consent work that keeps mainstream capital out is also the specialist’s moat, and most of the carbon revenue goes to the communities that keep the trees standing. Nazmul Karim describes the missing middle in South Asia, where SMEs outside India trade at valuations three to five times below their Indian peers, a gap far wider than country risk can explain. Growth equity there is also transition capital, as export-oriented firms must cut emissions to keep their buyers in Europe, Japan and North America.
Executive Summary
The contributions to this year’s report take up the work of building the market for transition investment. Each examines a place where the market has yet to form, whether for lack of a creditworthy buyer, of reliable information, of authorised supply or of growth capital, and asks what it would take for commercial capital to step in. Together they challenge the perception of concessionary returns directly: where investors help resolve a genuine market failure that other capital has not yet addressed, they can be both additional and commercially rewarded.
In the opening article, Bernardo Bortolotti and James Gifford set out the framework for that claim. The view that capital makes a difference only when investors accept lower returns, they argue, holds only where markets function well. An investment is additional when the company changes the world relative to a realistic counterfactual and the investor’s money is hard to replace. Too shallow a market failure leaves little to change; too deep a failure leaves little chance of commercial success, and is better suited to development finance, governments and philanthropy. In between lies a narrow band, the Goldilocks zone, where capital is both additional and earns risk-adjusted market returns. This is the target of transition investors. The zone exists because capital markets are inefficient, so the investor’s edge comes from capability rather than intention, and it is widest in the frontier markets that institutional investors visit least. Harvesting it calls for vehicles more patient than the ten-year closed-end fund, an area where sovereign wealth funds, family offices and other long-horizon owners hold an advantage, and for engaging with these markets before their data becomes ubiquitous.
Nana Maidugu argues that Africa’s investment problem is less a shortage of capital than a mismatch between the capital on offer and what projects need. Infrastructure needs long-tenor, local-currency, appropriately priced finance. What is available tends to be short-term and expensive, and it is often priced on blanket country risk assumptions that miss the economics of individual projects. Much of the “financing gap” is also a project-preparation gap. Projects with unresolved land rights, weak revenue models or incomplete feasibility work cannot be financed however much capital is available.
He sees the main role of sovereign wealth funds as building markets rather than funding deals one by one. That means using their capital to set up platforms, absorb clearly defined risks, and crowd in larger pools of private and domestic money. Concessional finance should go only to genuine market failures and should not cover ordinary commercial risk. He judges blended finance by whether it was truly additional and whether it can be repeated, not by the headline amount of capital mobilised. NSIA examples run through the piece: InfraCredit linking pension savings to infrastructure debt, the InfraGrow blended-finance platform, and RIPLE and the Nigeria DRE Fund as aggregation vehicles. He treats sustainability as part of financial discipline because it drives both risk and opportunity, not as a compliance exercise.
He closes with five priorities: deploy capital strategically, build bankable pipelines through self-replenishing preparation facilities, allocate risk efficiently, mobilise domestic institutional savings, and build sustainability into how value is created. Patient capital buys time. “Permanent capital” means institutions and markets that keep mobilising and recycling investment, with SWFs acting as architects of investment ecosystems rather than just sources of funds.
Bernardo Bortolotti and Martin Nagell then turn to a case where the economics already favour clean energy and the capital still fails to arrive. Business tariffs in 47 of Africa’s 54 countries exceed the cost of new solar or wind, and the oil- and diesel-fired plants that keep the lights on cost two to three times as much as solar with storage, yet the continent draws about 2% of global clean-energy investment. The obstacle is the buyer. A solar plant is paid for almost entirely up front, so its price is set by the cost of finance: in their model, moving from a 6% to a 14% cost of capital raises the price a solar-and-storage plant needs by about 65%. That cost, in turn, is set by the credit of state-owned utilities whose social obligations, pursued for good reasons, leave them short of cash when public transfers arrive late. The usual remedies, from letters of credit to sovereign guarantees, all lean on the same government. They propose instead a ring-fenced subsidiary, owned by the utility, that buys renewable power through open tenders and sells it to business customers, whose payments reach producers first through an independent trustee. Each element has worked somewhere, from Zambia and India to Britain, and the structure could earn a credit standing above the sovereign’s while control and dividends stay with the state. In five leading markets, Senegal, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa and Kenya, it could bring about 8.6 GW of solar with storage and US$8bn of private investment to financial close within ten years. In Senegal alone, replacing oil-fired supply to business customers could save the power sector in the order of €260m a year, several times the cost of this year’s cut to the social tariff.
Tarikua Erda turns to a different kind of market failure: the credit that dries up after a disaster. Drawing on four decades of US factory data, she compares floods that received federal disaster assistance with similarly severe floods that did not. Where aid flowed, floods mostly finished off plants that were already struggling, survivors upgraded their machinery, young firms bought the equipment sold off and grew, and new entrants were about 14% more productive than earlier ones. Without aid, banks lent mainly to firms they already knew, small and new businesses were squeezed out, and productivity and incomes fell. Public recovery money, she finds, helps a flooded economy renew itself rather than simply repair, and the extra tax revenue from stronger recoveries can repay the upfront cost, a lesson of growing relevance as climate change raises flood risk in regions with little history of it.
As usual, the report features contributions from our target region of choice: the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. Rana Hajirasouli argues that resource security, the confidence that the materials, assets and capabilities a business depends on will be available when conditions change, is an investment theme in its own right in the Gulf. As national champions such as Aramco and ADNOC qualify local suppliers, private capital can extend the work to the wider supplier base by financing independent verification of physical assets, coordinating resources across holding-group portfolios and funding the qualification of alternative suppliers. Wahid Kamalian shows how compliance carbon demand under CORSIA and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, together with disrupted supply of a forest ingredient that food and medical-device makers cannot replace, create a special situation in East Africa’s forests. The tenure and consent work that keeps mainstream capital out is also the specialist’s moat, and most of the carbon revenue goes to the communities that keep the trees standing. Nazmul Karim describes the missing middle in South Asia, where SMEs outside India trade at valuations three to five times below their Indian peers, a gap far wider than country risk can explain. Growth equity there is also transition capital, as export-oriented firms must cut emissions to keep their buyers in Europe, Japan and North America.
